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Abstract—Modern online multiplayer games are complex
heterogeneous distributed systems comprised of servers and
untrusted clients, which are often engineered under considerable
commercial pressures. Under these conditions, security breaches
allowing clients to employ illegal behaviours have become com-
mon; current commercial approaches have limited capabilities for
reacting rapidly to such threats. This paper presents an approach
to the detection of a cheating player, and describes a proof-of-
concept system designed to detect cheating play (specifically wall-
hacking) through the analysis of player behaviour. This approach
differs from current methods in that it does not rely on knowledge
about specific vulnerabilities and their method of exploitation
in order to protect the system, but instead monitors player
behaviour for indications of cheating play. Statistical evidence
is presented which shows that the proof-of-concept correctly
distinguishes between most cheating and non-cheating players.
I. INTRODUCTION
In conventional sporting games, rule breaking may take the
form of doping, i.e., through use of prohibited chemicals such
as steroids. In board games, rule breaking often takes the
form of collusion amongst players. And in complex online
computer games, involving multiple servers and untrusted,
heterogeneous clients, cheating manifests itself in curious
virtual versions of these real-world counterparts, e.g., ‘virtual
doping’ in the form of aimbots and speedhacks [1], and
‘virtual collusion’ in the form of ghosting [6]. But the possible
bounds of cheating extend much further in online games
than in the real-world. In an online game environment, the
laws of the game world are fundamentally more arbitrary
and mutable, allowing cheating users to afford themselves
extra-sensory abilities and advantages such as seeing through
walls (wallhacks), or learning about the exact state of other
players in the world (information exposure). Any game or
sport we conceive of and host in the real world is bound
by the immutable laws of our universe. We cannot be so
confident of the non-existence of exploitable loopholes, or of
the stability and reliability of the laws of a complex online
game world architected under commercial pressures. Thus,
through inevitable security loopholes and oversights, cheating
has become rife in a significant number of online games.
Clearly, if we are to improve confidence in, and the reputation
and enjoyability of online-gaming, as well as promote it as a
legitimate and mature pastime (or even profession) we must
work to protect the integrity of a game and deter or prevent
players from cheating.
Online game developers face an up-hill battle in combating
the cheat developers. Cheat developers are able to develop and
perfect an exploit in privacy and then, when ready, release it
to the public where it may be used immediately. From this
moment on, players are free to engage in cheating via this
provided exploit, before its existence may even be known
to the game developer. The result of this is that the game
developer always acts defensively, reactively countering the
exploits made public by the cheat developers. The reactive
nature of this cycle means that there is a considerable amount
of time available to cheaters where there is no method of
detection or defence against their behaviour. It takes time to
discover, understand, produce, and test a patch for a game.
Meanwhile, the install-base remains vulnerable to attack. No
repository of game-exploits is currently available in order to
formally determine the average time between exploit and sub-
sequent patch, but [23] and [24] provide access to supposedly
‘VAC-proof’ (unpatched) cheats, and frequently show active
cheats unpatched for several months. It is likely that exploits
commonly remain undetected for even longer periods of time
than this.
It is the fundamentally defensive nature of the game-
developer’s role which gives cheat developers their biggest
advantage; while the game-developer works to understand the
current exploits in the wild, there are already new mechanisms
for cheating under development. This is a battle which is very
difficult for the game developer to win, and it appears that the
issue requires the introduction of a disruptive technology or
technique in order break this cycle.
The work described in this paper investigates the technical
and life-cycle deficiencies which may permit or exacerbate
unwanted cheating activity. A proof-of-concept system is
presented that attempts to circumvent these deficiencies via
detection thorough behavioural analysis, which also abstracts
the provision of cheat detection, allowing it to be gener-
ically applicable across different online games and game-
engines without significant customisation. An implementation
for Valve Software’s Source (Half-Life2) engine running Coun-
terStrike: Source [20] is outlined, allowing the approach to
be quantitatively evaluated in a real-world production game
environment.
12th IEEE International Conference on Engineering Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS 2007)
0-7695-2895-3/07 $25.00  © 2007
II. CURRENT METHODS OF CHEATING AND
COUNTER-MEASURES
This section will look briefly at the current state of cheating
in online games in terms of: (a) common techniques used to
implement game-exploits; (b) illegal in-game advantages, or
cheats facilitated by those techniques; (c) commercial methods
and tools currently employed to provide protection against
cheating play; and (d) an overview of research contributions.
A. Common Cheat Techniques
The practical technique used to implement a cheat may take
a number of different forms which differ in complexity and
effectiveness. The cheats (or ‘hacks’) detailed here involve
the modification of the client computer, either in the form of
changing the client game code, or the client game environment
(e.g., drivers). As such, they may be categorised under Yan’s
[1] taxonomy of cheats, and also using the analysis from [11].
1) Hard-coded Hacks: Hard-coded hacks are considered
rudimentary, and are implemented by replacing code in the
installed client files, e.g., changing a DLL file to an altered
one. Such changes may improve aiming on the client-side in
the form of an aimbot, or change the engine code to render
walls semi-transparently. They are very tightly coupled to the
game-code, making them easy to detect; for example, asking
the client to create a hash of the local game-code will clearly
show whether the client code has been altered.
2) External Hacks (Fig. 1): An external hack exists as a
separate process to the game client, and does not alter the
client code directly. Instead it attempts to affect the play of the
game through legitimate channels. An early example of such
a hack involved changing the player model skins in the game
so that all enemies would appear flat-shaded red, the external
hack would then monitor the output of the graphics driver,
constantly scanning for red-pixels. When red pixels (which
denote an enemy) were detected in the output, the hack would
attempt to move the player’s mouse via the standard Windows
API so that the player in the game would aim automatically
at the enemy [12]. External hacks are considered basic; the
example described had a tendency for jerky movement, and to
erroneously lock-on to innocuous parts of the environment.
Client Server
Hack
Game 
code
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Fig. 1. External hack
3) Environment Hacks (Fig. 2): Environment-based hacks
involve altering the computing environment in which the
game client runs in order to cheat. It differs from hard-coded
hacks in that the game client code is left unaltered; it differs
from external hacks as no unique and independent process is
involved. A typical environment-based hack may involve the
altering or replacement of the client system’s video driver in
a way that makes rendered objects semi-transparent.
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Fig. 2. Environment hack
4) Hook Hacks: Hooks involve running the game from
inside a launch harness process, rather than from the game’s
main executable. This launch harness, or ‘hook’, can read,
control, and inject data into game memory locations. The hook
is programmed to be aware of important memory locations,
such as player positions, and so can access this data at run-
time to the advantage of the cheating player.
5) Packet Tampering (Fig. 3): Packet tampering involves
inspecting packets as they leave the client, and altering their
contents where it is determined more optimal play could
have occurred. The client game-code and environment remains
completely unaltered. An implementation normally consists of
an entirely separate machine acting as a proxy server to the
game-client system. The proxy server will run a sophisticated
program which inspects incoming and outgoing packets and
learns about the state of the game-world from them. In this
way, the proxy builds up basic information such as the position
of players in the world, and the orientation of the cheater. If
it detects an outgoing command-packet where the player has
attempted to shoot an enemy player but missed, the proxy
program may make alterations to the packet that indicates a
different orientation of the shooting player, one that would
have lead to a correct hit. The game server has no reason
to disbelieve this packet, making packet-tampering techniques
very difficult to detect, but also highly complex to implement.
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3: ''Miss-packet becomes 
'Hit' Command Packet
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Fig. 3. Packet-tampering hack
B. Common Cheat Implementations
The mechanisms outlined above allow a host of illegal
advantages to be bestowed upon a cheating player and have
been used to implement a great spectrum of such ‘cheats’.
This section takes a brief look at the next level of the game
exploitation process, that of common cheat implementations:
1) Wall-hacking: Wall-hacking is the name given to cheats
which provide the player with the ability to see through walls
in some capacity. The benefit to the cheating player is that he
can assess the location and movement of opponents to great
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advantage, such as preparing an ambush or pre-aiming at an
approaching opponent.
2) Aim-bots: Aim-bots provide the player with a computer-
augmented ability to aim at other players. All first-person
shooter (FPS) games rely to some extent on the reaction times
and accuracy of the player, an aim-bot removes these ‘hand-
icaps’ from the player by allowing users to aim immediately
and automatically at opponents.
3) ESP: Extra-Sensory Perception is the name of a genre
of information exposure cheats which involve divulging game
information to the player which he should not have access to,
and which awards him an unfair advantage over opponents.
For example, ‘Map’ ESP in the online game Counter-Strike
simply involves showing enemy locations on the in-game map
by way of a hook into the game memory which extracts the
client’s ‘behind-the-scenes’ information about the whereabouts
of other players.
4) Bang-hacking: Bang-hacks provide the player with im-
munity to the effects of blinding grenades in FPS games.
5) Cross-hair Cheats: In some FPS games certain weapons
which are intended to be used at long-range do not draw a
cross-hair to the screen. This works to prevent players from
using very powerful weapons accurately at short range, and
helps balance the gameplay. Cross-hair cheats reinstate the
cross-hair, either through a hook to the game-code, a hacked
version of the video-driver, or even an external process which
draws a cross-hair dumbly in the dead-centre of the screen.
6) Content-based Cheats: Content cheats involve modify-
ing the game content (e.g., textures) rather than the actual
engine code. For example, enemy textures may be altered so
that they stand out against the world, or enemy footsteps made
artificially louder.
C. Some Relevant Cheat-Prevention Techniques and Tools
Several cheat-prevention/detection tools have been devel-
oped, each of which employ an array of techniques in order
to try to prevent illegal play. The four major commercial
tools in use at the time of writing are: Valve Software’s
[20] ‘VAC’ (Valve Anti-Cheat) [18], Even Balance Inc.’s [21]
‘PunkBuster’ [16], United Admin’s [22] ‘Cheating-Death’
(now discontinued) and ‘HLGuard’ [19]. These developers do
not make public the full range of anti-cheat techniques that
their tools utilise, but the following list summarises what is
known about the mechanisms they employ, taken from the
above sources:
1) Memory-scanning: Involves checking the contents of
memory used by the game in real-time for the presence
of known cheat-hooks, or evidence of tampering with the
memory from outside the game-code.
2) Authorisation-servers: Provides a single, trusted account
server used by game-servers to indicate which users are
trustworthy, and therefore allowed to connect. The users
are identified by WON number or CD-key on Punkbuster
authentication servers, and by SteamID on VAC authentication
servers. This allows authorised game servers to ensure that
players connecting have not been blacklisted for cheating in
the past on any other authorised server.
3) Content-hashing: In order to detect alterations to game
files or game content, the Punkbuster or VAC server may ask
the client for a hash of a particular set of game files, and
compare this hash against what is expected.
4) Screenshotting: Administrators on Punkbuster enabled
servers may request a screen-shot of any player’s screen at
any time, the results of which may allow the administrator to
visually confirm suspicions of wall-hacks or other attacks.
5) API/Driver Scans: The anti-cheat package Cheating-
Death is known to scan for activity in the graphics driver
directly before launching a game in its own launch harness (or
hook), thereby monitoring for driver and API-based exploits.
6) Delayed bans: VAC implements a controversial policy
of delaying bans for some weeks after a cheating player has
been found and confirmed to be cheating. The reasoning for
this is that Valve believes more cheaters can be caught if time
is given for a cheat to spread.
7) Anti-wallhack: VAC has an inbuilt anti-driver-wall-hack
mechanism which checks whether opponents should be oc-
cluded by walls or objects in the gameworld, and will not
draw them if they are. This means that player models never
even get sent to the graphics driver, and so tampering with the
driver will not reveal the locations of opponent players.
8) Anti-crosshair: Cheating-death checks the window stack
to ensure that no program is running above the game in
the stack, so that cross-hairs for sniper weapons cannot be
provided in this manner by an external application.
D. Existing Research
A large proportion of existing academic work on cheating
and security for online gaming has focused on providing
a secure environment that makes peer-to-peer (P2P) based
gaming more feasible. There is interest in a pure P2P-based
game topology as it promises to reduce the cost overheads and
reliability issues of running complex and expensive central
servers. Despite these potential advantages, there is a resis-
tance to embracing P2P network architectures in multiplayer
online games, primarily because of the issue of information
exposure.
Chambers et al. [4] describe the issue of cheating in games
without a trusted non-biased central server and propose a ‘bit-
commitment’ scheme by hashing sensitive data and a secret
together. In this way clients can determine whether or not the
opponent was cheating after a game by verifying the final
known positions of the objects with the initial hash. This
method, however, means the cheating verdict can only be
ascertained at the end of a game, and it is not clear that
this solution is a scaleable one. Similar work on preventing
cheating by engineering specific communication protocols be-
tween a client and a central server has been undertaken by both
Chen et al. [9] and also Gauthier-Dickey et al. [10], who have
investigated the effects of latency and other communication
artefacts on game-play in traditional client-server systems and
peer-to-peer systems respectively.
12th IEEE International Conference on Engineering Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS 2007)
0-7695-2895-3/07 $25.00  © 2007
Kabus et al. [5] present a higher level approach to securing a
P2P based network architecture in larger scale situations such
as an MMOG (massively-multiplayer online game) rather than
smaller-scale RTS (real-time strategy) games. They propose
a more complete solution that ensures that no peer main-
tains game-world information that is applicable to the current
location/actions of the player at that peer. This means that
information exposure is still possible, but less applicable to
the local player. Rather than fix the fundamental issue of
information exposure, Kabus’ work attempts to minimise the
impact of the technique. Nevertheless, this does not preclude
the use of external tools for collusion amongst players, and can
break the benefits of locality of interest of the P2P architecture.
There appears to be limited previous academic work ad-
dressing the issues of gaming security and cheating specifi-
cally. Yan et al. [1][6] have provided a great deal of the foun-
dation work, identifying and classifying cheating behaviour.
Also, Brooke, Paige, et al. [7] have developed a conceptual
overview of fairness and legality in virtual societies, which
Foo and Koivisto [8] have also looked at from a practical
angle, investigating ‘griefing’ (bad) behaviour.
III. A BEHAVIOURAL-MONITORING APPROACH TO
AUTOMATED CHEAT DETECTION
Existing commercial tools as outlined in the previous sec-
tion are severely limited in their ability to detect and deter
cheating play. The fact that cheaters can move easily from
one exploit to another as older cheats are detected has,
for example, forced Valve to adopt a delayed ban system,
where detected cheaters are not banned immediately, in the
hope of catching more illegal players. Current techniques
are also poorly automated, requiring manual intervention (for
example: administrators needing to request and manually
check screenshots for evidence of cheating), are resident on
the client machine which is inherently untrustworthy, or are
highly game-specific and represent a non-portable investment
of development resources (for example HLGuard).
Most of these flaws stem from or are exacerbated by a
product lifecycle which gives every available advantage to the
cheat-developers. This lifecycle can be described as follows:
it is inevitable that a game will be released to market with
flaws, which will be exploited by cheat-developers over time
to enable various types of cheating. These exploits will be
detected by the vigilant developer, and usually in a matter of
days or weeks a client-server patch is issued to prevent this
particular method of exploitation from working. In conjunction
with this, cheat-detection systems may be updated on the
servers so that further attempts to use this particular exploit
may result in the banning of an individual from play.
Figure 4 shows this cyclical process, demonstrating the con-
siderable portion of time that a game is vulnerable to cheating
players during the product’s life. In reality this is an over-
simplification; several flaws may be exploited concurrently.
The presence of concurrent exploited flaws threaten to extend
the proportion of time that the game is vulnerable considerably.
Hackers Isolate 
New Exploit
Cheat Developed
Cheaters Adopt 
New Cheat
Developers Detect
Cheat
Game Vulnerable to Cheating
Developers Provide
Client or Server Patch
Days / Weeks / Months
Typically some 
weeks
Game Released
Fig. 4. Traditional exploit-patch lifecycle of a game
As Figure 4 suggests, the current practice for dealing with
exploits can be considered to be flawed:
• Most patches are developed to correct flaws that have
already been exploited in the wild (so-called zero-day
exploits), making the Patch-Exploit cycle entirely reac-
tive in its cheat-prevention. This ensures that the game-
developers maintain a perpetual disadvantage.
• Patching a game is expensive in terms of the monitoring
of the use of cheats, the development time and effort into
producing a corrective patch, as well as the distribution
costs of getting it to the players.
• In the rare cases where patches are proactive (fixing
un-exploited flaws), they can identify a flaw to cheat-
developers that had previously been undiscovered. The
cheat-developers may then take advantage of the fact that
it can take some time for all clients and servers to be
updated to this latest patch.
• Patches may introduce new flaws of their own.
• Some systems (VAC) delay the banning of cheaters who
have been detected by a number of weeks, so that the
cheating community is less likely to be alerted when
a cheat has become detectable, theoretically allowing
more cheaters to be caught. Valve determines this to be
necessary to catch more cheaters and prevent them from
moving to new undetected cheats quickly, but it allows
cheaters to cheat against legitimate players online for a
significant amount of time before being banned.
The solution that this paper describes is that of real-time
behaviour-based cheat detection. This concept relies on the
real-time monitoring and analysis of players’ movement and
behaviour in the game world, and is based on the central
hypothesis that players engaged in cheating exhibit behaviour
which is significantly distinguishable from normal play. If this
is the case, the cheaters may be identified without regard for
their chosen method of exploitation. A system based on be-
havioural analysis to detect cheating play promises significant
advantages over current anti-cheat mechanisms:
• It doesn’t matter how the cheater is cheating. They may
use a hook, a driver exploit, a highly complex packet-
12th IEEE International Conference on Engineering Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS 2007)
0-7695-2895-3/07 $25.00  © 2007
mutating proxy, or a hitherto undiscovered method - it
makes no difference to the ability of a behaviour-based
system to detect a cheater, as it operates via investigation
of the symptoms of cheating behaviour, rather than the
exact technical method used.
• Unknown future exploits offer no advantage over known
exploits. There is no benefit to the cheater in using an ex-
ploit unknown to the developer - the behavioural system
should detect all wallhacks/aimbots/etc. equally via their
symptoms rather than their particular implementation.
• A cheater may be intimately aware of exactly how the
behavioural system works, and what characteristics it is
monitoring. It is likely to still have a significant effect on
a player’s ability to cheat by forcing the player to refrain
from using his advantage (such as pre-aiming, shooting
through walls, tracking enemies through walls, etc.).
• There is less pressure on the developer to issue patches; it
is believed that common cheat techniques can be detected
automatically and the behaviour-based cheat detection
engine may be improved at the developer’s pace.
• The behavioural detection system may be run entirely
on the server, removing the possibility of tampering with
the client code, and pre-empting any man-in-the-middle
or proxy attacks. Also, the added resource-burden of
the behavioural analysis process is placed fully on the
dedicated server rather than the clients.
• A behaviour-based cheat detection system provides a
generalised and abstract method of cheat deterrence.
Security flaws and their associated exploits in contrast are
uniquely specific to a particular game or game engine, and
require an equally unique solution to fix. A behaviour-
based system may provide a level of protection to an
entire class of online game, with minimal re-engineering
required to be applicable to new games and engines as
they are developed.
Behaviour-based cheat detection is strongly related to intru-
sion detection. Such systems rely on two strategies to identify
security incidents; the first is signature recognition, which
compares data extracts from known exploits with incoming
data, and the second is behavioural classification, which uses
heuristic analysis to identify anomalous behaviour in networks,
host software or applications. Examples include honeypots
[15], systems with no operational purpose, allowing any
outbound connection to be regarded as a potential anomaly,
and host-based anomaly detection systems, where heuristics
based on the structure and behaviour of programs are used to
detect potential threats [17]. Anomalous behaviour can also
be identified at the application layer; for example, parameters
used to invoke web applications can be profiled and used to
detect unusual web-based requests [13]. These all demonstrate
the potential value of behavioural analysis as a means of
identifying attacks, and suggest the need to combine a range
of heuristics for acceptable false-positive performance.
IV. APPROACH
A proof-of-concept system was developed as a Source-
engine server plugin, and was designed to implement cheat-
detection through the behavioural analysis concepts which
have been outlined in the previous sections. The goal of the
proof-of-concept system was to provide the most simple im-
plementation possible that would demonstrate the effectiveness
and feasibility of this concept. In order to achieve this aim,
the system concerns itself with only a single type of cheat,
wall-hacking, in first-person-shooter games.
The proof-of-concept behaviour-based cheat detection sys-
tem resides on the game-server as a Source-engine plugin,
from where it may monitor the actions of players within the
game world. Figure 5 shows a high-level overview of the
architecture of the cheat detection system as implemented.
The analysis engine is componentised and abstracted away
from any first-hand interaction with the game-server specifics.
Game-server communication takes place via an interaction
layer comprised of an input component and an output compo-
nent. The input component is designed to be engine-specific,
it will interface directly with the game-engine pulling player
data and performing world-traces upon the state of the game
to determine the required information. This is formatted and
passed to the analysis engine. The output component is re-
sponsible for taking the outputted cheat-score for a player,
and passing this back to the game-server so that it may be
acted upon.
Analysis
Engine
Inputs / 
Traces
Outputs
Game Server
Game server queried 
for player data
Outputs visualised 
to players
via the game 
engine
Fig. 5. Architecture for the proof-of-concept system
This architecture allows for a high level of portability -
only the interface components (inputs and outputs) need to
be re-written for a new game-engine. Also, by abstracting
the analysis engine it is possible to update and improve the
detection algorithms without having to affect the rest of the
system, or the clients.
A key element to the understanding of how exactly the
proof-of-concept plugin detects wall-hacking behaviour in-
volves the concept of a trace: The plugin must be able to
detect precisely what the player is ‘looking’ at, at any moment
in time, and what that object in the world is. A ‘trace’ is a
mechanism provided by the Source engine which allows us to
achieve this, it takes the form of a vector which, when ‘run’,
reports information back about what it has hit in the game-
world. Traces may be combined with trace filters, which filter
the objects that are opaque to a trace, for example; allowing it
to pass unhindered through walls and other world-geometry,
but returning a hit for entities (players) in the world. The wall-
hack-detecting proof-of-concept requires two different types
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of trace filter, a world filter which only returns data about
the base-world geometry that it has hit (world trace) and an
entity filter which passes through all world-geometry as if it
weren’t there, returning only information about any entities
it hits, regardless of whether the they are behind a wall in
relation to the tracing player (entity trace).
To be able to monitor for the characteristic behaviour
of a cheating player, it was first necessary to identify and
understand the observable differences between the play of a
legitimate player and a cheater, essentially answering the ques-
tion ‘what observable characteristics would allow a system
to tell a legitimate player and a cheating player apart?’. No
previous work studying the practical behaviour of cheating
gamers is known to the authors, and so the first phase in
the development of the proof-of-concept system involved a
study of captured trace-data of both a wall-hacking player
and a legitimate player playing Counterstrike:Source on the
same maps under the same conditions. The legitimate player
used the standard release of CS:S (version 1.0.0.5), the wall-
hacking player used the same version augmented with version
1.1 of the FSKWallhack wall-hack by ‘Felikz’ and ‘slayer-
es-me’. Play-data in the form of a series of trace-results
was captured from the engine as the users played, and was
then reviewed to determine the defining characteristics that
may help distinguish a cheater from a legitimate player. This
produced the following four metrics which, it was determined,
demonstrated noticeable differences between the two:
• Frequency of illegal traces: An illegal trace is defined
as a trace (vector along a player’s line of sight) from the
player under observation to an enemy entity where the
trace passes through opaque world material before reach-
ing the opponent model. The rationale for this selection
is that non-cheating players would trace to enemy players
behind walls only by chance, whereas it was hypothesised
that wall-hackers may tend to track enemies behind walls,
thereby giving themselves the advantage that they had
aimed and were ready to fire when the opponent is no
longer occluded by world material.
• Distance to world material: To a wall-hacker, world
material (such as walls) does not occlude the player’s
view, whereas during play, a legitimate player will tend
to focus on the farthest point of the map within his field
of view. Therefore, it was hypothesised that wall-hacking
players would exhibit strange behaviour such as having
unusually small traces to world material (appearing to
stare blankly at a wall).
• Distance to illegal traces: A legitimate player may
make chance illegal traces to players behind walls. The
randomness of these traces should make it equally likely
that such a trace is to a far away player as to a very
close player (after target-size difference for the opponent
entity is accounted for due to distance). A wall-hacker,
however, may be more likely to track closer enemies as
he takes advantage of his ability. Due to this, it was
hypothesised that the distance to illegal traces will be
on average smaller for wall-hacking players than for
legitimate players.
• Consecutivity of illegal traces: A legitimate accidental
trace is unlikely to last more than the briefest of moments
as both players move and look around the game-world.
A wall-hacker, however, may have a tendency to con-
tinuously track an opponents movements behind world
material, building up a string of consecutive illegal traces.
It was hypothesised therefore that the consecutivity of
illegal traces is much higher for wall-hacking players than
for legitimate players.
The capacity of these metrics to distinguish between legit-
imate and illegitimate play was investigated during a metric-
testing phase, where data for the four metrics was obtained
and compared for a player while cheating and also playing
normally. Two separate maps were used in the test to minimise
possible idiosyncrasies of world-layout. The results of the
metric-test can be seen in tables I-IV, and figures 6 and 7.
Table I shows the power of differentiation of illegal trace
frequency, giving a 2.37x difference between legitimate and
cheating play on the map de Chateau, and 2.63x in the
frequency of traces between the two for the map cs Office.
Table II shows the results after the data was processed to
allow a grace period of 1, 3, and 6 seconds between a
player legitimately seeing an opponent, and being punished
for illegally tracking them behind a wall. The rationale for this
grace period is that legitimate players may track opponents as
they run behind a wall for cover, thus tracking them behind
world-objects illegally, by giving a grace period of a few
seconds after legitimately seeing an opponent it ensures that
legitimate players cause fewer false positives. This can be seen
in the higher differentiation rates.
TABLE I
ILLEGAL TRACE FREQUENCY METRIC
Map played Mean trace interval Difference
de Chateau normal 20.3s 2.37x
de Chateau wallhack 8.55s
de Office normal 16.67s 2.63x
de Office wallhack 6.35s
Figures 6 and 7 show the results of the world-distance
metric as a histogram demonstrating the difference between
the player and the closest world object being looked at
(normally walls). From this data, it appears that there is a
slight tendency for cheating players to have a larger proportion
of close-distance world-traces (less than 300 world units) than
legitimate players.
Table III shows the power of differentiation between a
cheating player and a legitimate one, based on the distance-
to-illegal-trace metric. This metric shows that the legitimate
players illegal traces were on average 0.53x the distance of
the same player cheating for the map de Office. This level of
differentiation was not present in the de Chateau test, but as
more data was available for the de Office test, it is believed
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TABLE II
ILLEGAL TRACE FREQUENCY WITH GRACE PERIOD METRIC
Map played Grace
Period
Mean trace
interval
Difference
de Chateau normal
1 second
37.4s 3.4x
de Chateau wallhack 10.99s
de Office normal 17.86s 2.48x
de Office wallhack 7.21s
de Chateau normal
3 seconds
41.8s 3.6x
de Chateau wallhack 11.61s
de Office normal 20.0s 2.77x
de Office wallhack 7.21s
de Chateau normal
6 seconds
41.8s 3.6x
de Chateau wallhack 11.61s
de Office normal 20.0s 2.77x
de Office wallhack 7.21s
Fig. 6. Comparison histogram of distance to world behaviour, comparing
cheating and legitimate players. Map: de Chateau.
Fig. 7. Comparison histogram of distance to world behaviour, comparing
cheating and legitimate players. Map: cs Office.
that this result is due to too small a data-set for that particular
map.
TABLE III
MEAN DISTANCE TO ILLEGAL TRACE METRIC
Map played Mean Trace Dist. Difference
de Chateau normal 844.40 units 0.99x
de Chateau wallhack 834.12
de Office normal 1132.90 0.53x
de Office wallhack 604.98
The consecutivity of traces metric provided the data in table
IV, showing a 1.5x differentiation for the map de Chateau, and
1.7x for the map de Office. It was considered, however, that
to better distinguish between a legitimate player accidentally
illegally tracking an opponent, and a cheating player, consecu-
tive illegal traces would be punished exponentially rather than
linearly. This increases the level of punishment considerably
for extended strings of consecutive illegal traces, a character-
istic that very strongly suggests wall-hacking activity. When
this change was made to the metric, the metric’s power to
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate players was
improved, scoring 3.68x higher for cheating users playing
de Chateau, and 4.49x higher for cheating users playing
de Office.
TABLE IV
CONSECUTIVITY OF ILLEGAL TRACES
Map played Mean Number of
Consecutive Traces
Difference
de Chateau normal 1.07 1.5x
de Chateau wallhack 1.6
de Office normal 1.08 1.7x
de Office wallhack 1.84
A non-parametric rank sum test [25] was used (for all of the
metrics) to evaluate the null-hypothesis that the data from the
cheating player, and that from the legitimate player are from
the same distribution. All of the metrics bar one rejected the
null-hypothesis at a significance level of 5%. The data that did
not meet this level of significance was the distance-to-illegal-
trace data for the map de Chateau. The data-sample for this
metric was uniquely small, and this is likely to be the cause
of the different statistical results for this one set of data in
isolation.
An algorithm, drawing on the above data showing the
varying ability of the metrics to distinguish cheating play, was
developed. The algorithm combines all four metrics giving
greater power to those which showed a higher capacity for
differentiating. The system records these metrics every 0.1
seconds at runtime, and uses them in the algorithm to provide
a probabilistic score that a certain player is cheating. Results
from the metrics which are likely to have arisen due to illegal
play will cause an increase to a player’s cheat-score, persis-
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tent abstention from such behaviour will gradually reduce a
player’s cheat-score. Thresholds can be established where it
can be significantly improbable for a player to attain a certain
cheat-score through legitimate play, and can be used to mark
such a player as a highly probable cheater. The algorithm used
to calculate the cheat score for a player is shown in expressions
(1) to (6).
X = the set of all traces
I = the set of all illegal traces
Xplayer = the set of all traces for the player analysed
Iplayer = the set of all illegal traces for the player analysed
Xplayer ⊂ X, and Iplayer ⊂ I
(1)
a = 60
|Iplayer|
t
(2)
Equation (2) calculates the frequency of illegal traces a
player makes, per minute, by taking the total number of illegal
traces, dividing that figure by t, the elapsed time of the game
in seconds, and then multiplying by 60, to get the figure in
minutes.
b = a(
X¯
X¯player
) (3)
Equation (3) calculates the world-distance metric, based on
the difference in the mean of all the analysed player’s traces,
and the mean of all combined players.
c = a(
I¯
I¯player
) (4)
Equation (4) calculates the illegal trace-distance metric,
based on the difference in the mean of the analysed player’s
illegal traces, and the mean of all combined players’ illegal
traces.
λ =
( |Iplayer|
|{i : xi ∈ Iplayer ∧ xi−1 6∈ Iplayer}|
)2
(5)
Equation (5) calculates the score for the consecutivity of
illegal traces for the analysed player. This is done by dividing
the total size of the set of illegal traces I , by the number
of individual ‘runs’ of illegal traces (traces whose predecessor
was not an element of the illegal trace set), to give the average
consecutivity of traces per run. This value is then squared
to more harshly punish higher levels of consecutive illegal
tracing.
Final ‘cheat-score’ = b+ c+ λ (6)
Equation (6) shows how the final cheat score is determined,
by summing the world-distance score, the illegal trace distance
score, and the consecutivity of illegal traces score.
V. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Testing was undertaken with three test subjects, each provid-
ing several hours of cheat-score data, generated as described
by the algorithm discussed in the previous section. The three
subjects were all students aged between 20 and 30 years, and
were selected for their experience of online gaming, experi-
ence with FPS games, experience with CounterStrike:Source,
and their basic understanding of the current situation regarding
cheats in online games. This was to ensure that the results were
close to the play of most normal, competent players, and that
they would not be skewed by players unfamiliar with controls
or gameplay mechanics etc.
The results are presented in the form of the cheat-scores
reported by the algorithm outlined in the previous section,
the higher the cheat-point score, the more likely the system
‘believes’ the player to be cheating. The results are shown in
figures 8, 9, and 10. The results show promise in the ability
of this technique to distinguish between a legitimate and a
cheating player. The system’s power of distinction between
cheating play and non-cheating play varied widely, at its
greatest, a differentiation of 1200x between the scores of the
cheating player and non-cheating player (same subject, same
map) was observed. At its weakest, it diminished to 1.4x. The
mean power of differentiation, across all subjects and all maps
was 22x, i.e. on average a player scored 22-times the cheat-
score when cheating as compared to when playing normally.
One particular anomalous sample was of note in that it
showed a higher score for normal play than for cheating
play (average of 1.9 points for the normal, and 0.9 points
for the cheat). After the samples were taken, the subject was
debriefed and asked about this anomaly. He answered that he
was intentionally trying to play exactly as he had been before
without taking advantage of the cheat, partly out of interest
(but also because he found with the wall-hack he was actually
performing more poorly in the game than before). This is
interesting in that it shows the plugin is essentially capable of
detecting when a player is taking advantage of a cheat rather
than whether he is using one at all. This is not considered
a particular issue with the future applicability of this method
of cheat prevention, as it works to prevent a cheater from
taking advantage of his illegally obtained abilities - that is,
he may be able to see through walls, but he must not use this
ability to his benefit. All other samples showed that the plugin
could differentiate between the two styles of play. As an aside,
it is interesting to consider the difference between preventing
cheating itself, and preventing gain through cheating, which is
essentially what is achieved by this technique. It is the opinion
of the authors that the two are very often equal in preference.
It is considered important that cheating players may be
detected as quickly as possible so that their influence may
be removed from the game-world. For the proof-of-concept
system, it appears that the time to distinguish a cheating player
is between 250 and 350 seconds, as the system needs a certain
number of samples to settle. This is still a promising time for
an early proof-of-concept, and may be further improved with
12th IEEE International Conference on Engineering Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS 2007)
0-7695-2895-3/07 $25.00  © 2007
Fig. 8. Score results across six bouts of play for subject 1
Fig. 9. Score results across six bouts of play for subject 2
a more mature algorithm.
The results show a score-threshold at around 20 points
which would distinguish a cheater from a legitimate player.
With a threshold in this range, all normal players in the
test would be properly identified as non-cheating, and 7 of
9 cheating samples would be properly identified as cheating.
False positives, then, appear rare, no legitimate player achieved
a higher average score than 6.6. False negatives however
appear more likely to cause problems. Some sample data
showed a very low score of 0.89 for one game while the
subject was cheating (this is the anomaly already discussed).
Another two samples show an average score of 8.46, and
8.9, both recorded by cheating players, which would not have
been distinguished by a system with a threshold set to 20-
points. Overall however, this is not discouraging, with the
aforementioned threshold, over 70% of cheating players would
be identified.
VI. FUTURE WORK
The scope of this work was limited to a focussed and
basic implementation, designed to provide a proof-of-concept
system that would demonstrate the feasibility of taking this ap-
proach to game security. Now that this ground-work has been
established, and the results have indicated that behavioural
analysis of play may indeed effectively identify the presence
Fig. 10. Score results across six bouts of play for subject 3
of cheating, there is ample opportunity to enhance the proof-
of-concept by expanding on the metrics used as a method of
identification.
This paper isolated just four metrics to consider: Frequency
of illegal traces; consecutivity of illegal traces; distance to
world traces; and distance to entity traces. It has been shown
that these metrics are indeed able to provide an indication
of the likelihood of a player cheating, but no work has been
done in assessing the efficiency of these metrics’ powers of
differentiation, they were simply chosen based the informal
monitoring of wall-hacking players, and the fact that they
were relatively easy metrics to capture from the engine. This
opens two immediate avenues for future work: The assessment
and tuning of the metrics used, and the development and
assessment of new (more complex) metrics. For example,
metrics based on movement and/or speed, metrics involving
reaction times of the player after first seeing a new opponent,
and more complex patterns of play etc. Despite having been
shown empirically to distinguish between cheaters and players,
the metrics employed have no rigourous statistical foundation,
confirmation of their true statistical significance would be
desirable in future work.
One may imagine that a more complete behaviour-based
cheat-detection system would have many of the characteristics
of an artificial immune system, such as the ability to classify
and distinguish players based on complex interdependent
inputs, the ability to recognise cheating play by way of
a negative-selection algorithm [2], and an ability to make
decisions based on noisy data. An Artificial Immune System
approach could also allow for the game-servers to collaborate
and communicate their work on classification of players to
each other, further enhancing an individual system’s ability to
distinguish and classify players, work of a similar conceptual
nature has been applied to fault detection in ATM machines
by Timmis et al. [3].
The work described in this particular paper considers only
wall-hacking, but the characteristics of the proof-of-concept
are such that it is possible that the system could be engineered
to detect other types of cheats. The software could, for ex-
ample, analyse players for characteristic behavioural elements
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which occur when a player uses an aimbot. Such a system
would monitor reflexes, the jerkiness of the player’s aim, etc.
and produce a cheat score based on the likelihood that a player
is using an aimbot.
A more advanced and automated way of capturing the
characteristics of a particular cheat through the monitoring
of a known-cheating player would be a great asset. Such a
system could produce ‘profiles’ for different classes of cheat
which would be used by the server-plugin. Depending on the
complexity and detail of the play-characteristics that could
be captured, it may be possible to create profiles which are
capable of distinguishing particular patterns and characteristics
with great levels of subtlety. It may then be possible to char-
acterise and detect very complex behaviours such as various
types of nuisance-play (griefing). Some types of cheating, such
as information exposure (e.g. enemy positions being shown on
a players map) may be much more difficult, or even impossible
to detect via a behavioural-monitoring system as proposed by
this paper. Such cheats would still have to be combated via
existing traditional methods, but it is worth noting that wall-
hacks and aimbots are considered to be the most significant
and widely deployed cheats in many FPS games. There is also
a possibility that an expanded and more flexible system could
operate on other game genres, not just the FPS genre that
has been the focus of this project. MMORPGs (‘Massively-
multiplayer online role-playing games’) represent a slightly
more complex environment with a greater level of social
involvement, and would be an interesting genre to investigate.
The typical cheats used in an MMORPG may be different
to those in an FPS, but it would be interesting to attempt to
isolate the behavioural characteristics of cheating users in this
different gaming domain.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has explored the struggle to effectively combat
security issues in complex multiplayer-games. It is believed
that this failure originates from the commercial pressures of
game development, which ensures that there will never be
sufficient resources available to properly engineer security
into what is a complex distributed system, and that cheat-
developers will always have the advantage of time and secrecy.
We have presented a solution to the problem of detecting
tell-tale behavioural characteristics of cheating rather than
detecting the cheating mechanism itself. In doing so, we have
abstracted out the process of providing a certain level of cheat
protection for a game, an abstraction which allows a single sys-
tem to be portable to many different games and many different
game-engines with minimal re-engineering and at little cost.
This technique has been tested and implemented in a proof-
of-concept system, which is designed to detect wall-hacking.
The system was built to work in conjunction with a mod-
ern production game-engine, Valve Software’s Source, and a
modern and popular multiplayer game, Counterstrike:Source,
demonstrating the validity of this approach though translation
of the concept to a production system. The proof-of-concept
system, although primitive, showed significant success in its
ability to distinguish between legitimate players, and cheating
players. This success, the authors believe, provides fertile
ground for further work and expansion of the technique, per-
haps by way of taking inspiration from work on classification,
differentiation, and anomaly detection in the field of artificial
immune systems.
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